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Martinez-Study: Chapter III

 
[Dies ist weder eine offizielle UNO-Webseite noch eine von der UNO autorisierte oder geprüfte. Dieser Text wurde von dem Konferenzraumpapier CRP.1 der 16. Sitzung der Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Genf vom 26. bis 31. Juli 1998 gescannt. Anschließend wurde er per OCR nach HTML konvertiert von der Aktionsgruppe Indianer & Menschenrechte e.V., Frohschammerstr. 14, 80807 München.]

Chapter III: A look at the present: Origin, development and consequences of the domestication processlink


168. It must be recalled that in establishing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, both the Commission and ECOSOC instructed him “… [to take into proper account] the social-economic realities of States…”.52 It is therefore imperative for him to review the present day situation of Indigenous peoples now inhabiting multi-national States. However, the current situations cannot be fully understood if the origins and development of the process of domestication of Indigenous issues, are not examined as well.

169. Any attempt, at the end of the 20th Century, to arrive at a general approach to the vast, complex, and more than 500 years old problematique of the Indigenous peoples, should not — and can not — ignore a fundamental fact: their initial contacts with “non-indigenous” peoples from other parts of the world, dating back to the late 15th Century, were the result of the launching and development of European colonial expansion.

170. This expansion, in turn, was inherent to the new mode of production emerging in Europe during the final part of the late Middle Ages. By the last decade of the 15th Century, this new economic model had already developed enough scientific, technological, and financial wherewithal to allow it to successfully launch exploration companies, “discovery” expeditions, and colonisation in the search for new trade routes and markets in far off regions. The theatre of these operations included the Americas, Asia, Africa, the vast expanses of the Pacific, or, even, in certain parts of the periphery — insular or not — of Europe itself.

171. Other contributing factors to this expansionism at a later stage included: religious intolerance, oppression based on national origin, and the economic and social marginalisation of certain sectors of the European populations, as well as antagonisms and confrontations between the European powers during diverse epochs. All this would, in later centuries, foster both the establishment of new initial contacts in the hinterlands of the territories “discovered”, and the further development and consolidation of the colonial phenomena as a whole.

172. Despite the surfeit of pious excuses that has been found to ethically justify the launching of this overseas colonial enterprise, and the pseudo-juridical (sometimes even openly anti-juridical) reasoning which has attempted to “legally” defend it, there is irrefutable evidence that its clearly well-defined goals had nothing either “humanitarian” or “civilising” about them.

173. Its first raison d’etre was to guarantee a permanent presence of the overseas power — either in terms of settler populations or mere trading posts — in territories inhabited by other peoples. Secondly, it sought to acquire the rights to exploit the natural resources existing there and to secure these new markets for its import and export needs. Thirdly, it coveted those new strongholds to strengthen its position in the struggle with other European powers. Finally, it sought to safeguard what had been acquired by imposing its political, social, and economic institutions and modalities on the peoples inhabiting these lands.

174. This goal was to be accomplished at any cost, even — should it be necessary and possible —, that of the destruction of the often highly advanced culture, socio-political institutionality, and traditional economic models whose development over centuries by the Indigenous peoples represented no mean achievement.

175. Just as has been reasoned before in a previous Report submitted in 1995, the overseas colonial undertaking differed completely from the very common phenomenon of expansion into adjacent territories (at the expense of their neighbours), practised by the peoples in those “new” territories before the arrival of the European colonizer. Its inborn nature, the exploitative, discriminatory, and dominating character of its “philosophy” as a system, the methods employed, and the final results it had on very dissimilar societies mark the difference.

176. These dissimilarities acquire today — as a result of the decolonisation process (still unfinished) in the second half of the 20th century — an even greater dimension as far as Asia, the Pacific, and Africa are concerned. As a direct result of decolonisation, the gap left by the “non-indigenous” colonial political powers in those continents has been filled by population sectors whose “indigenous” (or “autochthonous”) condition is indisputable by any of today’s standards.

177. It must be borne in mind that, according to all available information, the terms “indigenous”, “native”, “mitayo”, “Indian”, “autochthonous populations” and others of a similar cast, do not come from the lexicon of those whom we today label “Indigenous peoples”, but from the vocabulary utilised by the “discoverers”/conquistadores/colonisers and their descendents, to differentiate themselves — in a relationship of superiority-inferiority — from the original inhabitants of the new territories being added to the European crown jewels.

178. The initial encounters were, of course, coloured by different shades of light. Some were guided solely by the logic of outright force. We must recall that the sword — efficiently backed by the cross — has for more than 500 years sealed the fate of tens of millions of the original inhabitants of Latin America and the Caribbean and that of their descendents.

179. The right emanating from force — and imposed by it as an instrument of assimilation/marginalization policies — was also the basis of the “asymmetric” bilateral relations between Indigenous peoples and the criollos established in the new Latin American republics after independence from Spain and Portugal. The victory of Ayacucho meant little or nothing for the original inhabitants, who simply found themselves subject to the domination of new rulers.

180. This has been, in general, the situation of the region. It was true both in those countries that were fully colonised before independence was obtained, as it was in those where it was left to the new Republic — consider, for example, the cases of Argentina and Chile — to complete, also by force, in every corner of the new State. Only in an extremely limited number of cases (when no way could be found around an effective refusal to submit, i.a. in the parlamentos on the Chilean Araucnia) are there vestiges of juridical obligations assumed (although rarely met) with “the Indians” through negotiation and legally binding instruments.

181. However, in different latitudes of the Americas, as well as in other areas of the world, these first contacts were not marked exclusively by military force. On the one hand, this was related to then-predominating political and juridical discourse in the societies from which the outsiders came. On the other, it reflected the balance of forces that originally existed between the newcomers and the well organized societies that had populated these “new” territories for centuries, a balance that was to radically change with the progress of the colonisation process.

182. A case in point is Britain’s progressive colonisation — and that further advanced by its successors in the original 13 colonies (the kernel of the U.S.) at the end of the 18th century — of the vast tracts of land today comprising Canada and the United States. There, a “juridical factor” (i.e. treaties) was introduced. To a certain degree, this form of initial contact can also be seen in the French colonial endeavours in parts of these same territories at that time. During the progressive advance from the Atlantic to the Pacific, military might coexisted with negotiations and juridical instruments, as the basis of relations between the coloniser and the Indigenous peoples encountered.

183. In the general run of late cases — especially in Africa and in certain areas of the Pacific —, the initial colonial presence and implantation also began with a low profile. This can be seen, for example, in British behaviour both in Africa and in New Zealand.

184. In many places, successive waves of settler migration from the metropolis (case of Hawaii), or of Royal Trading Companies’ representatives (frequent in the “East Indies”); and certain legal modalities (some highly “innovative” such as the “perpetual leasing” of territories) emerged alongside the traditional juridical forms (bilateral agreements and treaties). All, however, sought the same end: to secure the colonial domination.

185. These options were employed according to the real needs and possibilities of the alien powers in each specific case. This is so, whether it was done to formalize, ex post facto, the acquisitions already made or to smooth the path for any future military action that might be required.

186. However, something must be said about the juridical instruments that emerged to suit the first stages of the diverse periods in which the initial contacts occurred. Their intrinsic natures, forms, and contents make it clear that the Indigenous and non-indigenous parties mutually bestowed on each other (in either an explicit or implicit manner) the condition of sovereign entities in accordance with the non-indigenous International Law of the times.

187. It must be stressed that certain States had a very powerful motivation for making these treaties or other international instruments of a contractual nature requiring the consent of participants. Furthermore, this motivation (in the direct interest of the non-indigenous party) was quite clear: to legitimize (via the acquiescence of the autochthonous sovereign of the territories in question) any “right” (real or intended) with which they could counter opposing claims advanced by other colonial powers vying for control of those lands.

188. However, to acquire such “rights” via derivative title (since they clearly lacked original title, or because the legality of their presence in those areas was being questioned), required that they seek the agreement of the legitimate holder of the original title, i.e., the Indigenous nation in question. The latter would have to do this by the formal cession of their lands (or their sale, or a concession of acquisitive possession, or any other type of valid transfer).

189. In accordance with European legal tradition and formalities, this transfer should appear in a document that could be presented as proof before the colonizing power’s equals in the “concert of civilized nations”. The ideal instrument for this, according to the International Law of the epoch, was the treaty. Furthermore, the only entities with the juridical capacity to make treaties were (like today), precisely, international subjects possessing sovereignty — their own or delegated by other sovereigns —, through the exercise of it.

190. In a second phase of the colonisation project and until it peaked — during its “classical” manifestation or a variation thereof, and very particularly as of the second third of the 19th century — there was a visible increase in the use of military force to acquire vast tracts of “new”. territories. This shift was very much in line with the enormous power already being wielded by the traditional European imperial powers and by others who emerged later only to begin their own expansionism.

191. The newcomers’ descendents increased their military and economic capacity, while that of the Indigenous peoples remained (in the best of cases) the same or (most frequently) decreased rapidly. Whichever variation of this occurred, the result would be the same: a growing vulnerability of these peoples to the machinations of the non-indigenous (with whom they had possibly made treaties/agreements) but who now wished to ignore their sovereignty and impose a “new order” on their ancestral homes.

192. Thus began the process that the Special Rapporteur has preferred to call (without any pretension of originality) the “domestication” of the “Indigenous question”. This is to say, the process by which this entire problematique was removed from the sphere of international law and placed squarely under the exclusive competence of the internal jurisdiction of the non-indigenous States. In particular, although not exclusively, this applied to everything related to juridical documents already agreed to (or that were negotiated later) by the original coloniser States and/or their successors and Indigenous peoples.

193. It may be argued that in the light of International Law today — particularly on the basis of Article 2-7 of the United Nations Charter — such a claim for the reserved domaine of domestic jurisdiction could, prima facie, find juridical backing.

194. However, to legitimize beyond any doubt the ways and means used to take issues that originally belonged to the realm of international law away from it and to justify making them subject solely to domestic legislation unilaterally passed by the States and adjudicated by domestic non-indigenous courts, States should produce unassailable proof that the Indigenous peoples in question have expressly and of their own free will renounced their sovereign attributes.

195. It is not possible to understand this process of gradual but incessant erosion of the Indigenous peoples’ original sovereignty, without considering and, indeed, highlighting the role played by “juridical tools”, always arm in arm with the military component of the colonial enterprise.

196. In practically all cases — both in Latin America and in other regions mentioned above —, the legal establishment can be seen coming together and serving as effective tools in this process of domination. Jurists (with their conceptual elaborations), domestic laws (with their imperativeness both in the metropolis and in the colonies), the judiciary (subject to the “rule of [non-indigenous] law”), one-sided international law (its enforcement assured by military means), and international tribunals (on the basis of the existing international law) have all been present to juridically “validate” the organised plunder at the various stages of the colonial enterprise.

197. There are abundant examples of this: the 1898 Joint Resolution under which the U.S. Congress, after using force to impose a treaty, consummated the outright annexation of the sovereign State of Hawaii (which had manifold international juridical relations with other “civilized” nations), and the “scramble for Africa” formalized at the 1885 Berlin Congress by the colonial powers of the epoch are just two of the many examples. Others also supporting this assertion can be found in the progress reports submitted earlier by the Special Rapporteur.

198. The concept “rule of Law”, began to traverse a long path today in a new phase transforming it into “the Law of the rulers”.

199. Yet, one cannot fail to mention the role played by decisions taken by some Indigenous peoples themselves, in this very same process of domestication; most of them, however, taken under extremely difficult conditions, or in a clear “state of necessity”, to use a juridical expression.

200. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur has chosen to state his views on this matter keeping very much in mind the forward-looking aspects of his mandate, and highly aware of the significance of the lessons to be drawn from History, mutatis mutandi, in the process of building a new, more just, and solid relationship of co-existence between the Indigenous and non-indigenous sectors in a considerable number of modern societies. History is an excellent source of knowledge for shaping political action. To ignore history, would make it incredibly difficult to fully understand the present and practically impossible to wisely face the future.

201. In this context let it be said that, the Special Rapporteur’s historical research showed, in his view, that not all Indigenous nations made the wisest choices at all times. This is to say, at some crucial moments in their history, some Indigenous nations were not capable of putting the need to unite among themselves over their individual interests, even though unity was necessary to properly confront the encroachment on their sovereign attributes. This was true, even when bhe ultimate intentions of the newcomers were already evident. The terrible consequences inherent in allowing themselves to be divided appear not to have been totally perceived.

202. In addition, on more than one occasion they do not seem to have recognised the pros and cons in all their dimension, nor the final consequences of a policy of alliance with European powers. This can be said about both those who adopted this policy in line with their ongoing fratricidal struggles, and of those who decided to favour one of the non-indigenous powers over the others, in the military confrontations that took place in their ancestral lands.

203. Further, it also seems obvious that they could not fully appreciate (or that they widely underestimated) the questionable role played — and still played in many cases — by diverse religious denominations or their representatives as effective instruments of the colonial enterprise in its various stages.

204. It is easy to see the negative effects of such a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors not only on their initial sovereign condition, but also on their overall international juridical status. These effects also included the extinction (or substantial reduction) of their territorial base and undermined their political, economic, juridical, cultural, and social order in general, and even their survival as a distinct society.

205. These negative effects are perceptible, to a greater or lesser degree, whether or not the relations between these peoples and the colonizers were juridically formalized by means of treaties/agreements.

206. The most lethal of these effects has been, of course, the already consummated (or presumably soon to occur) extinction of these peoples as social entities with distinct identities.

207. It is impossible to determine with any certainty in 1998, the number of indigenous peoples extinct since the times of their first encounters with the “discoverers” as the result of the “civilization” imposed on them. Nor is it possible to say how many more will disappear in the not so distant future, unless the circumstances in which they live in the multi-national States today do not change.

208. According to all indications (and to cite just two known examples), the original inhabitants of Catalina Island off the coast of California and the Yanomamis of Roraima should be included in the category of “peoples in danger of extinction”.

209. The relentless carving away of their lands as a result of the most varied actions, their expulsion from these lands — via either the use of direct force by the new State, or because they could not obtain the resources to continue practising their traditional economic activities or to continuing tilling the soil —, the draconian restrictions on the use of their own languages and on the practice of their religious beliefs (or the prohibition of one or both) have contributed, historically and currently to this situation.

210. The effective exercise of their attributes as international subjects had already been effectively liquidated circa the third decade of this century in all areas of the world in which bilateral treaties between Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples had been relatively frequent in the past. This process coincided with the United States Senate decision at the beginning of the 1870s, to discontinue treaty-making with Indigenous nations and to refuse treaty status to the instruments still awaiting ratification.

211. In this respect, one must also recall the Indigenous peoples’ unsuccessful attempts (despite President Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Points”) to reestablish recognition of their international status by the League of Nations; or to gain access, in their own right as peoples, to the International Court of Justice, established by the United Nations Charter as the principal judicial organ of the new world Organisation that emerged as a result of the Axis defeat in the Second World War.

212. This was so despite the large number of Indigenous soldiers who contributed to the Allied victory in that war, and despite the Preamble to its Charter which declares that the U.N. was established by “the peoples of the United Nations”, who through their governments declared themselves in 1945 “determined to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained” [Emphasis added].

213. Furthermore, this was the situation even though the Charter, in formulating one of the purposes of the Organisation, recognizes (Article 1-2) the importance of respect for “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”. A simple, direct, and unqualified way of saying all peoples, bar none.

214. In the current contemporary context and in the framework of this same Charter provision, it is worth underlining, at least in passing, the patent incongruency in the position of those who used this Charter reference as a basis for legitimising the decision by some nations formerly part of the today-extinct USSR (e.g., the so-called Baltic countries) to secede from it, claiming their status as full sovereigns, while, at the same time, objecting to even mentioning that same right in the context of debates related to Indigenous issues.

215. This is not the only example of the double standard treatment Indigenous peoples are receiving in the current milieu of the United Nations, although the Organisation has devoted much greater attention to this issue as of 1962, with the establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. To be kept in mind are the insurmountable obstacles confronting their efforts to fully represent themselves in bodies in the United Nations system other than the Working Group. Such was the case in 1989, when the ILO discussed and adopted Convention 169, whose text is directly related to their daily living conditions.

216. Moreover, similar difficulties blocked the much needed full participation by Indigenous organizations in the Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights to discuss the draft “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations”; a forum for which strict rules for participation were instituted, that, in fact, are limiting to a good degree the indigenous input in such debate. No similar rules were applied for non-governmental organizations without recognized ECOSOC status in the case of another working group established by the Commission, i.e. the one dealing with the rights and responsibilities of “human rights defenders”.

217. The constant reduction (or total disappearance) of their territorial base not only affected their real capacity to survive as peoples but is the source of the most crucial aspect of the “Indigenous question” in its current context. It deals with the right of these peoples to the use, enjoyment, conservation, and transmission to future generations of their ancestral lands; in peace, without outside interference, in accordance with their own uses, customs, and norms of social life. We will come back to this issue.

218. Once the work of the initial conquistadores/colonizers or their successors was completed, the colonial process advanced toward the gradual or rapid dispossession of Indigenous lands.

219. It is not the task of the Special Rapporteur in this Final Report to describe in detail the harsh impact of being subjected to a new and totally alien social, economic, and political-juridical order. Much has been published on the subject by both Indigenous and non-indigenous sources (including by official government bodies in the States now inhabited by these peoples). He will only attempt to summarize its most relevant effects — some still lingering even at the end of the 20th century —; in particular, those touching on land rights.

220. It must be stressed, in this regard, that for these peoples their lands (from whence they came or where they live today) hold singular spiritual and material values. It contains for them the essential elements of their cosmogony. It is the ultimate source of life and wisdom. They believe in the collective enjoyment of what it provides; in the inalienability of something not “owned” but “preserved” for future generations. It plays an irreplaceable role in their religious practices. In short, their understanding of the land was (and is) singularly different from that imported by the newcomers and their successors. The latter’s approach, logically, reflected (although not always exactly) the predominant values of their respective societies.

221. Grosso modo, and at the risk of generalising, the newcomers and their continuators imbued (and imbue) the land with an essentially patrimonial value, subject to exclusive individual appropriation — and, thus, capable of being passed on to others at the will of the title holder —; as a source of material wealth, and a basis for political and economic power.

222. The process that took the indigenous peoples’ lands from them left behind very limited and debilitating alternatives for survival: vassalage (or servitude in its diverse forms), segregation in reduced areas “reserved” for them, or assimilation into the non-indigenous sector of the new socio-political entity created without indigenous input. The last alternative meant the social marginalization and discrimination prevalent in these mixed societies, about which little or nothing could be done despite praiseworthy efforts by certain non-indigenous sectors.

223. Various methods were utilised to achieve dispossession of the land. They, unquestionably, included treaties and agreements, at least if we accept the non-indigenous interpretation of these documents (and in general, that version is the only one available in written form). This issue will be returned to later.

224. Coercion — either by armed force or by judicial and legislative institutionality, or both — was very frequently brought to bear. This is true whether or not its employment was preceded by formal juridical commitments contrary to it.

225. It went to extremes, as mentioned in an early report. An example is the forced exodus in the 1830s to the other side of the Mississippi of the so-called “five civilized tribes” of the southeastern United States. This is the first documented case of “ethnic cleansing”, the background available to the Special Rapporteur, as duly noted in a previous report.

226. Another method was frequently employed to attain dispossession in those cases in which no juridical instruments of any sort had been compacted. This took advantage of the inability of the Indigenous peoples (or individuals) to show “property deeds” considered valid under the new, non-indigenous law. This made their ancestral lands vulnerable to seizure by non-indigenous individuals holding such documents (acquired via the most diverse — and, most often, less than honourable — means), or by the central or local authorities, who claimed them as public property (or lands belonging to the Crown, or federal lands) subject to their jurisdiction.

227. The total or partial dispossession of their lands (a basic life source in all categories) created new forms of dependency or sharpened the pre-existing ones. First, it notably affected the ability of Indigenous authorities to effectively exercise their functions and also the capacity of these societies to be self-sustaining by way of their traditional economic activities. All this had a traumatic impact on their social framework.

228. The new non-indigenous authorities hastened to create a distinct political-administrative order to replace the traditional Indigenous authorities and the decision making mechanisms that had guided these societies for centuries. This was a generally successful effort. However, in multiple cases it could only be achieved with the participation of certain segments of the Indigenous societies, already subject to stresses of all types.

229. Similarly, in recent times, there has opened up the possibility of Indigenous participation, as such, in certain aspects of the non-indigenous established political order in some multi-national societies. This is particularly true in the parliamentary area. Examples can be found in Colombia and New Zealand/Aotearoa.

230. The Special Rapporteur welcomes these developments which appear to be steps in a positive direction. This is particularly true in the case of the latter country. Its electoral law gives the Maaori population the option (to be freely taken) of registering on the list reserved for them. Still it remains to be seen just how much of a real impact this type of measure will have in the enormous effort required to achieve more just relations between both sectors of these same societies.

231. In economic terms, the loss or substantial reduction of their territorial base had lamentable consequences. The impossibility of continuing their traditional economic activities (or of having to carry them out in greatly reduced areas) generated a constant migration to non-indigenous economic centers, in particular, to large cities. For multiple ccmmunities this has meant the loss or severe reduction of their demographic base and, in general, the acculturation and progressive loss of Indigenous identity by a significant number of their members.

232. Today, in lands still not affected by dispossession — in particular, in those cases where no treaties or agreements exist — there is a continuing and visible affect on the traditional economic activities. This is so because of the juridical insecurity (according to non-indigenous law) of their effective possession of the land and the inroads made by alien technology for the exploitation of natural resources (including the subsoil, rivers, forests, and fauna).

233. There is a long and varied list of such cases. For this reason, it is impossible to enumerate them all in this Report. It is enough to point out that the great majority of these people eke out an existence under obviously precarious conditions. This is due to a number of factors: the direct threat of forced eviction, in some cases; the obligation at times to obtain licenses or permits from non-indigenous administrative authorities to be able to engage in their traditional economic activities (or to be limited by restrictive quqtas that do not cover their needs); forced, in other cases, to seek the authorisation from these same authorities to make use of natural resources, even when their ownership has been recognised even by non-indigenous law, or subjected in general to the effects of modern technology on their traditional habitat.

234. The general situation of the Australian aborigines — even after the well-known decision in the Mabo case — and the situations that affect the Lubicon Cree and Hobbema peoples/nations in Alberta, Dene (Navajo) in Arizona, Crees in James Bay, Québec, many segments of the Maaori peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and the Mapuche in southern Chile are some tangible examples of Indigenous peoples living in the precarious economic conditions described above.

235. In this respect, it should be mentioned that during his field work among the Cree of Québec (1993) and the Mapuches (1998), the Special Rapporteur could confirm — both from personal observation and from vivid testimony — the enormous irreversible damage already caused to, or threatening, the Indigenous habitat because of the re-routing or damming of large rivers (such as the Upper Bio-Bio or the Great Whale River Basin) to build large scale hydro-electric plants; whose output, by all accounts, is earmarked for consumption by the non-indigenous population (even in other countries).

236. As can be inferred from all of the above, every aspect of the Indigenous peoples’ socio-cultural life, including, obviously, their religion, has been negatively impacted by the overall process of “domestication” (which touches on all areas), as well as by its obligatory corollary, dispossession from and the loss of effective control over their ancestral lands.

237. Whether subject to the control of a system of direct servitude or to a sort of judicial guardianship (or trusteeship) similar to that applied to minors; whether assimilated (or on the way to being assimilated) and marginalised in the new societies; or restricted to small areas surrounded by another powerful, aggressive, and alien culture, or living in other lands on the periphery — in flight from the non-indigenous authority (having lost their own) —, these peoples witnessed multiple attacks on their rich social fabric.

238. First, it is important to note the forced separation of families, as children and adolescents were sent — for long periods during their formative years — to religious schools far from their original natural environment. In those institutions they were rewarded for accepting assimilation, while any expression of their original identity (such as speaking in their own language) would draw severe punishment, including corporal.

239. They also saw the destruction of many manifestations of their historical-cultural heritage and the desecration of their cemeteries and other sacred sites. The archeological treasures of their lands and even the bones of their ancestors are still exhibited today in numerous non-indigenous museums around the world, despite the efforts to recover them, the national laws passed to protect them, and the protests of many international organizations.

240. Over the remains of demolished temples there stands impressive cathedrals or other manifestations of the new culture. In addition, the Special Rapporteur has received sound information on at least two attempts, in recent years, to build golf courses on lands of recognised religious value to Indigenous peoples.

241. On no few occasions, and during long periods, their customs, ceremonies, and religious practices were simply and categorically prohibited. Moreover, in many cases they lost access — for diverse reasons — to the places where, according to their traditions, these practices and ceremonies should take place. In one or another of these situations, they have been forced either to celebrate them clandestinely at the risk of serious sanction (the case of Sundance in North America), or (like the slaves brought from Africa to the Caribbean and Brazil) to ingeniously disguise them in alien liturgy, such as that of the Catholic religion, a common phenomena in Latin America.

242. Their institutions and cultures were considered “inferior”, “archaic”, and “inefficient and impractical” by non-indigenous sectors. These negative views were promoted daily and urbi et orbis via the most diverse methods (“scientific” literature or simply by word of mouth) and quickly became part of the “conventional wisdom” in large sections of the political and academic worlds — as well as for vast segments of the population at large — in the pluri-national societies in which Indigenous peoples continue to live today.

243. Thus, there should be nothing surprising about the desire of a number of Indigenous individuals to assimilate, nor about their acceptance of the ethical or material values of this alien society by which they are surrounded. The common root of this evident threat to their survival as distinct peoples can be found in the obvious erosion of self-esteem afflicting certain sectors of diverse Indigenous peoples nowadays. This is even true in a stage such as the present one, in which there is also a highly noticeable, vigorous process of recovery and development of these peoples’ traditional values.

244. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the lack of employment opportunities and, in general, the inability — in the current circumstances — to achieve a sustainable development according to their own traditions has contributed heavily to this loss of self-esteem. This is particularly evident for peoples caught in the “indigenous reserves” system established in the United States and Canada — as well as in other situations in northern Europe and Greenland.

245. All too frequently, their daily reality feeds the belief that their survival is possible thanks only to the “subventions” and “services” provided by the State on which they depend. These services might be of greater or lesser quality and coverage, and the assistance might be direct or indirect; but what all these instances have had in common for centuries is that their cost is always, by definition, less than the value of the benefits accrued by the non-indigenous sector with whom they share the society.

246. Finally, it must be stressed that in practically all cases in which Indigenous peoples live in modern multinational States, their social development indexes are lower, or less favourable, than those of the non-indigenous sectors with whom they co-exist.

247. This is true for some of the most important socio-economic indexes: employment, annual income, pre-natal and infant mortality, life expectancy, educational level, percentage of the prison population, suicide rate, etc. Quite regularly, the official figures provided by the competent sources in these countries provide proof of the above assertion.

248. All of the above explains why for more than fifteen years the Sub-Commission and the Working Group have dealt with Indigenous issues under an item entitled “Discrimination against Indigenous peoples”; the same title carried by the seminal report by Mr. Martínez Cobo published 16 years ago. Not much of substance has changed for Indigenous peoples since then. The basic elements of their relationships with the non-indigenous world remain unchanged.

249. Nor is it by chance that the Commission — on the very date on which it established the Special Rapporteur’s mandate — recognised (in impeccable diplomatic parlance) that Indigenous peoples “in diverse situations could not enjoy their inalienable rights and liberties” (viz. resolution 1989/34 of 6 March 1989, paragraph six of the preamble).


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